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EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-DIRECT APPLICATION OF
COMMUNITY LAW-ARTICLE 119 OF THE TREATY OF ROME REQUIRING
EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK HAS DIRECT EFFECT UPON NATIONAL LAW
OF MEMBER STATES.
On October 1, 1963, plaintiff Gabrielle Defrenne was promoted from "air
hostess" to the position of "cabin steward, air hostess/principal cabin at-
tendant" with defendant Belgian airline, the Socitd Anonyme Belge de
Navigation Arienne (hereinafter referred to as Sabena). The new contract
signed at the time of the promotion contained a clause requiring all female
members of the cabin crew to cease work at age 40. Pursuant to this
contract, plaintiff was required to stop work on February 15, 1968, and
receive severance pay of one year's salary. Plaintiff brought proceedings
against Sabena before the Tribunal du Travail in Brussels claiming com-
pensation' for (1) the difference in the salary she received and the salary
to which a male employee with the same position and seniority would have
been entitled and (2) the disparity in pension and severance pay accorded
to male and female employees. 2 The Tribunal du Travail dismissed the
claim and appeal was brought before the Labor Court at Brussels. Finding
that disposition of the case required interpretation of article 119 of the
Treaty of Rome, 3 the Labor Court referred the case to the Court of Justice
Ms. Defrenne claimed compensation on the grounds that:
(1) The salary paid to her during the period between February 15, 1963
and February 1, 1966 was 12,716 Bfrs. less than that to which a male steward
with the same seniority would have been entitled;
(2) She ought to have been recognized as entitled to a higher pension up
to a maximum of 334,000 Bfrs.
On February 1, 1966, "Sabena, of its own accord placed 'hostesses' and 'stewards' on the
same basic rates of pay." Defrenne v. Socidt6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation Mrienne
Sabena, [1976] 2 CoMM. MKT. Rzp. (CCH) $ 8346 at 7295.
1 Ms. Defrenne, at the same time she filed the instant suit, applied to the Belgian
Conseil d' Etat for annulment of the Royal Decree of November 3, 1969. The Court of
Justice held that a retirement pension formed part of a system of social security provided
for by law and was not included within the concept of pay as contemplated by article 119
of the EEC Treaty, even if the employer contributed to the financing of the scheme since
this is done for reasons of social policy rather than as payment for work done. Defrenne
v. Belgium (80/70) 1970.
' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. (unofficial English version) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. The treaty may
also be found in [1973] 1 CoMM. MKT. RFP. (CCH) $ 151. Article 119 provides:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should re-
ceive equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or mini-
mum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind,
which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employ-
ment from his employer.
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of the European Communities4 for a preliminary ruling pursuant to article
1771 of the treaty. Held, reversed. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome intro-
duces into the national law of the original Member States the concept of
equal pay for equal work among men and women and thereby directly
confers the right to bring suit in the national courts, regardless of whether
or not the State has taken any action to incorporate the treaty provision
into its domestic law. Defrenne v. SociWt Anonyme Belge de Navigation
A#rienne Sabena, [19761 2 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346.
Article 119, which requires the application of the principle that men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work, was incorporated into the
EEC treaty7 with a dual purpose. Economically, article 119 was intended
to minimize the possibility of distorted competition thereby preventing one
State's implementation of "equal pay for equal work" from adversely af-
fecting intra-Community competition in the job market and work force.8
Socially, article 119 was one of the numerous provisions in the treaty
designed to promote improvement of the living and working conditions of
the European peoples.? Although the Member States had ratified article
119 as an integral part of the Treaty of Rome, the question of to what
extent the integral articles of the treaty created rights and obligations
directly enforceable within the legal systems of the Member States re-
mained.O
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the
basis of the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
For the convention establishing the Court of Justice, see generally, SwEEr & MAXWELL,
EuRoPEAN COMMUNrrY Ta zArxs, 105-09 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SwEETr].
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
[19761 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346 at 7295.
Note 3 supra.
The travaux preparatoires indicate that this was a primary purpose in incorporating
article 119 into the EEC Treaty. R. Van Lint, [1969] Cashiers de Droit European 373,
383.
[1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346 at 7289.
" There is considerable authority, in the form of case law in both the Community Court
of Justice and in many national courts recognizing that certain provisions of the treaty
have this broad impact. See generally CAMPBELL, COMMON MAmRET LAW, (Vol. III, 1973) §
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The extent to which the provisions of the treaty are to be given direct
effect within the Member States in the absence of implementation through
national legislation has been a recurring question for the Court. In N. V.
Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming, van Gend & Loos v.
Netherlandse Tariefcommissie,"1 which has been referred to as "the most
important decision ever handed down by the court dealing with individual
rights,"12 the Court established the principle that the Treaty of Rome not
only created a set of rules to govern the international relationships of the
Member States,'3 but also established rights and obligations directly en-
forceable in national courts by citizens of Member States, who are also
subjects of the treaty." However, this holding was limited in its applica-
tion; the treaty provision had direct legal effect upon national law only if
it (1) laid down a clear and unconditional prohibition which invokes a
negative rather than a positive duty and (2) did not require implementing
legislation by the Member State in order to be performed.'5 If these criteria
were met, the treaty article "by its very nature, lends itself perfectly to
producing direct effects in legal relations between the Member States and
persons under their jurisdiction."'" It has been noted that the van Gend
decision "abrogates for the community the traditional approach whereby
each Treaty partner itself determines the effect and applicability of a
treaty to private parties."' 7 The practical result was that any individual
could interpose treaty provisions before national courts and obtain an ad-
ditional hearing before the Court of Justice under article 117.1
The first of these limitations was partially removed by Salgoil S.p.A. v.
Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Italy," in which the Court
held that articles 33(1) and 32 of the treaty20 were not directly effective
1.83 [hereinafter cited as CAMPBELL].
"1 [1963] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8008. Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome, in issue
here, places a duty on Member States to refrain from introducing among themselves any
new customs on imports or exports or any increases in those customs already applied.
11 Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual Before the Supranational Judi-
cial Tribunals, 41 U. DEr. L.J. 405, 433 (1964); [hereinafter cited as Gormley]. The
importance of the van Gend decision was compared to that of Marbury v. Madison in the
United States system and that of the Lawless and DeBecker decisions in the Council of
Europe. Id. at 428.
Comment, 4 N.Y.U. J. INr'h L. & POL. 134, 136 (1971).
Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlandse Tariefcommissie, [19631 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. 105,
129.
11 Thus, the Court rejected the traditional standard of treaty interpretation. For the
traditional view see the conclusions of Advocate General Karl Roemer which were rejected
by the Court. Gormley, supra note 15, at 434.
Comment, 4 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 134, 137 (1971).
" Hay, Federal Jurisdiction of the Common Market Court, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 21, 37
(1963).
" Gormley, supra note 15, at 433.
[1968] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8072.
SwEgr, supra note 4, at 71.
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because these articles involve an affirmative duty to act on the part of the
State. However, the Court noted that had these articles been sufficiently
specific and had they left little discretion to the States regarding compli-
ance, the provisions would have been given direct effect, even though
affirmative in nature. This holding significantly expanded the van Gend
criteria for direct applicability.2' Continuing in this vein, the Court ruled
in Reyners v. Belgian State2 that article 52 of the treaty, 23 imposing an
affirmative duty, "constituted an obligation to attain a precise result, the
fulfillment of which was to be made easier by, but not be dependent upon,
the implementation of a programme of progressive measures ... " by the
Member States.24
In Defrenne v. Sabena the Court of Justice is asked for an interpretation
of a specific article of the treaty to determine its impact upon the domestic
law of the original Member States in the absence of implementing legisla-
tion. The Court faces the question of whether article 119 has direct effects
and creates personal rights for individuals,2 5 which the national courts are
bound to recognize and protect. 2 An affirmative answer to this question
requires the Court to go further and make recommendations to the refer-
ring court regarding the time limit imposed on the States for recognition
of the equal pay principle.
Following the rationale of these cases, the Court reiterates the criteria
by which the direct applicability of a treaty provision must be determined.
The standard it uses is that, in order for a provision to directly confer on
21 See also Firma Alfons Ltticke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, [1974] 2 COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8045 at 7611:
To date you have considered directly applicable only those articles which
contain an obligation to refrain from acting. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, however, erroneously infers from this that there is a general and
exclusive rule. The truth is simply that, because of its nature and content,
an obligation to act fulfills the conditions for being considered directly appl-
icable much less often and less easily.
Reyners v. Belgian State, [1975] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8256. Reyners involved
a suit against the Belgian state based on article 52 of the EEC Treaty. The plaintiff
claimed that he was subjected to discriminatory conditions for admission to the profession
of advocat which were not applied to Belgian nationals, in violation of article 52. Article
52, imposing an affirmative duty, provides in part: "[Riestrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State
shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional period." (empha-
sis added).
23 See note 3 supra.
2 Wyatt, Directly Applicable Provisions of EEC Law-I, 125 NEW L.J. 458 (1975).
" Prior to the instant case, the predominant view had been that article 119 did not
create rights directly enforceable in the courts of Member States. Blaise Knapp, 'L'
Egalit6 des travailleuxs masculins et feminins dans la CEE et en Suisse' in (1968)
Rapports du Centre d' Etudes juridiques europ~ennes (Geneva).
[1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346 at 7289.
"7 SwEET, supra note 4, at 107.
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individuals the right to enforce it in the national courts, the provision: (1)
must be clear and sufficiently precise in its content; (2) must not contain
any reservation; and (3) must be complete in itself, such that neither the
States nor the Community need to take any steps of subsequent implemen-
tation to assure its application by national courts. The Court finds that
article 119 meets these requirements. 28
The Court then makes a recommendation concerning the time limit or
effective date for the application of article 119." Generally, article 8(7)30
and specifically, the wording of article 119,11 provided that the right of
equal pay was to be ensured by the end of the first transitional period,
January 1, 1962. Just before this date, the Member States adopted a reso-
lution extending the time limit to December 31, 1964.32 The Court faces
the question of whether this joint resolution is effective to extend the time
for the direct application of article 119. If this question is answered affirm-
atively, the provision should not be deemed to have been in direct effect
at the time the plaintiff entered into her new contract with Sabena on
October 1, 1963. The Court, relying on two prior cases,33 rules that the
Member States were powerless to alter the clear provisions of article 119
of the treaty and declares that the resolution was nothing more than a
political act expressing concern for the implementation of the article."
Due to the impossibility of ascertaining with certainty the general level
at which pay would have been fixed at any time prior to the decision in
Sabena, the Court further limits the effect of the judgment so as to exclude
claims based .on pay periods prior to the date of the decision, April 8, 1976,
except where workers had already filed such claims. 5 In limiting the retro-
active effect of its ruling, the Court demonstrates that it recognizes the
possible economic consequences for companies that are subject to the rul-
ing, and it safeguards these businesses against possible bankruptcy by this
limitation on applicability."
2 For a contrary view see Campbell, supra note 10. Campbell claims that article 119
specifically envisages legislative or administrative implementation by Member States,
and that prior to an action in a national court the Member States must have taken the
action required of it by the treaty.
[1976] 2 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346 at 7291.
SwEr, supra note 4, at 64.
' Id. at 97: "Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure .
See also Council Directive 75/117 adopted on Feb. 10, 1975, which was mooted by the
Defrenne ruling. This directive gave the States until August 10, 1975, to enact legislation
implementing article 119.
Ministero v. Manghera, [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8342 and Reyners v.
Belgian State, [1974] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8256.
Ministero v. Manghera, [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8342 at 7224.
[1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346 at 7293.
u EUROMARKEP NEWS, COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) April 27, 1976, No. 380, at 2. However,
Commission attorneys maintain that this restriction severely impedes the impact of the
judgment. Id. at 2.
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Pursuant to the recent trend in the Court of Justice, the holding in
Sabena extends the effect of article 119 directly into the national law of
the Member States, giving individuals the right to base suits upon this
provision as of January 1, 1962, the end of the first transitional period
imposed by the Treaty of Rome. In so declaring, the Court demonstrates
that it is a powerful, autonomous entity, which does not succumb to pres-
sures placed on it by the Member States, the Council of Ministers, or the
Commission of the European Communities." The decision establishes defi-
nite criteria for the determination of whether a certain provision of the
treaty is to be given direct effect; article 119 successfully meets these
criteria and becomes, in effect, a part of the domestic law of all Member
States.
While most Member States either enacted equal pay legislation or relied
on a constitutional provision which allowed employees to sue employers,
some had given the task of negotiating equal pay conditions to the unions
and employers. Under the Sabena ruling it seems rather doubtful whether
these practices will be permissible any longer as the equal pay principle is
now a directly enforceable legal right."'
The holding in Sabena and the language of article 119 are not broad
mandates against the many forms of sex discrimination which exist in
society. Sabena is limited to sex discrimination in the area of equal pay
for equal work" and has no direct application to such areas as discrimina-
tory hiring and promotional policies.10 The ruling is, however, an addi-
tional step in the movement to decrease the social and economic inequities
resulting from discrimination based upon the sex of the worker.
Recognition of basic personal rights is one of the general principles of law
which the Court of Justice must safeguard. "The protection of these rights,
while it was inspired by the Constitutional traditions common to all Mem-
ber States, must be carried over to the structure and goals of the Com-
munity."" In the line of cases culminating with the decision in Sabena,
the Court is developing a system of European law which is absolutely
EUROMARKET NEws, COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), April 27, 1976, No. 380, at 2.
' Id. at 3.
' The Advocate General stated that beyond the partial definition of "equal work" in
article 119 (see para. 3, note 3 supra), it has been observed that article 119 "does not try
to determine when men and women are doing the same work but only to ensure that the
sex of the worker is in no way taken into account in decisions on pay. Whether the work
is the same or different is a question of fact to be determined in every individual case in
accordance with the responsibilities assigned to each person concerned. [19761 2
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8346 at 7297.
,0 For example, the clause in the plaintiff's contract which required women to retire at
age forty could not be attacked under article 119, as well as the decision with respect to
pension and retirement pay.
41 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelee fur Getreide
und Futtermittel, [19721 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8126 at 1134.
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necessary if the European nations are to become a united economic institu-
tion.2 As one commentator indicated:
An organic Europe would hardly remain viable for long if it rested on a
fragmentary legal system, composed of many varied and contradictory
laws, and applying this or that law indiscriminately, as the occasion
seemed to demand. Nor can one conceive of a United Europe without the
gradual establishment of not only public, but also private, Community
law, applicable to all matters covered by the Treaties.' 3
V. Gail Lane
42 Gormley, supra note 15, at 427.
,5 Le Court, Community's Court of Justice Builds European Law, EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY
No. 65 (Sept. 1963) at 6.
